BERENSON_FMT.DOC

10/23/02 1:50 PM

USING MANAGED CARE TOOLS IN
TRADITIONAL MEDICARE—
SHOULD WE? COULD WE?
ROBERT A. BERENSON* AND DEAN M. HARRIS**
I
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, policy analysts seeking important opportunities for
reform in the Medicare program have looked at the experience of private markets and managed care in the private sector. Managed care organizations
(“MCOs”), in general, and health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”), in
particular, seem to have hit the wall in recent years in their ability to contain
costs.1 They have experienced a public backlash against many of their policies
and procedures, resulting in marketplace, legislative, and legal reactions that
have altered their operations.2 Nevertheless, many policy analysts continue to
look to managed care and competition among private health plans as the bases
for structural reform of Medicare.
Proponents of market forces in health care often advocate both managed
care and managed competition, but, although related, the concepts are quite
different. For purposes of this discussion, we apply the term “managed care” to
supply-side interventions meant to affect directly the efficiency and quality of
health services delivery. In contrast, “managed competition” attempts to alter
individuals’ demand for care among competing private insurers, thereby
affecting provider behavior only indirectly.3
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1. Jon Gabel et al., Job-based Health Insurance in 2001: Inflation Hits Double Digits, Managed
Care Retreats, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 180, 181 (documenting recent inflationary trends in
job-based health insurance and declining HMO enrollment).
2. See Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failures and the Evolution of State Regulation of
Managed Care, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 194 (2002) (reviewing any-willing-provider and
freedom-of-choice laws). See also Richard Sorian & Judith Feder, Why We Need a Patient’s Bill of
Rights, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 1137, 1138-43 (1999); Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence
of Selective Contracting Restrictions, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 1133, 1134 (1997) (describing
the any-willing-provider and freedom-of-choice laws in fifty-one jurisdictions).
3. See Richard B. Saltman and Joseph Figueras, Analyzing the Evidence on European Health Care
Reforms, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 85, 102-04.
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In discussions of Medicare reform and restructuring, most attention has
been on putting the Medicare equivalent of managed competition into place.
As initially articulated by Henry Aaron and Robert Reischauer, Medicare
would be converted from a service reimbursement system to a premium support
system in which Medicare would pay a defined sum toward the purchase of an
insurance policy that provided a defined set of services.4 For purposes of this
discussion, a fundamental purpose of a premium support approach is to make
beneficiaries price-sensitive in their choice among competing private plans and
traditional fee-for-service (“FFS”) Medicare.5 By migrating to lower-priced
plans, beneficiaries would be exposed to private plans featuring managed care
approaches to restraining costs and improving quality.
What has not gotten much attention in the debate over the desirability of
premium support is how the traditional FFS program should be permitted to
compete.6 The program might remain a passive, unmanaged program.
Accordingly, beneficiaries could avoid some or all managed care interventions
by paying more out of their own pockets to remain in the traditional Medicare
program. Alternately, the traditional program could become an active competitor that might be given greater authority to manage costs, using managed care
approaches, and would be relieved of its social policy functions, such as supporting graduate medical education and providing a disproportionate share of
hospital payments.7 Under current premium support models, the issues related
to the transformation of Medicare into an active purchaser permitted to use
particular managed care interventions need to be addressed.
This article will first look at purchasing/managed care tools in the context of
the traditional Medicare program. Then it will describe the general policy and
administrative constraints that any regime of active purchasing would face.
Some of these restraints narrow significantly the range of purchasing opportunities available in Medicare. Next, the article will propose a few purchasing techniques with which Medicare might proceed. Instead of compiling an exhaustive
listing of managed care techniques that Medicare might adopt, as others have
4. Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer, The Medicare Reform Debate: What Is the Next Step?,
HEALTH AFF., Winter 1995, at 8 (providing the rationale and proposal for converting Medicare from a
service reimbursement system to a premium support system similar to developments in the private
sector).
5. Under the most recent iteration of the premium support model, competing private health plans
would set prices through negotiation with the federal government. The traditional fee-for-service
program would set a national premium, and its members would pay the same amount regardless of
where they lived. The government contribution to private plans would be a fixed percentage of the
national premium up to a specified dollar limit. Payments to plans would be adjusted based on
demographic and health status factors and adjusted for geographic location. Beneficiaries would pay,
on average, a base percentage of the premium. In current proposals, this would be twelve percent.
Those who chose plans that cost more than the government contribution would pay all of the extra cost
themselves and those who picked a plan below the government contribution level would get a rebate.
See Gail R. Wilensky, Medicare Reform–Now is the Time, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 458, 460 (2001).
6. See BETH C. FUCHS & LISA POTETZ, REFORMING MEDICARE: A FRAMEWORK FOR
COMPARING INCREMENTAL AND PREMIUM SUPPORT APPROACHES 28-32 (1999) (discussing how the
traditional fee-for-service program might function under a premium support framework).
7. See Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 4, at 26.
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done,8 the article will center on a few managed care techniques: those that have
been the most controversial and are being abandoned by MCOs as well as those
that pose the greatest policy and legal challenge to the Medicare program—the
ones that are commonly criticized as threatening physician autonomy or interfering with the doctor-patient relationship. Finally, this article will review in
detail the legal issues associated with Medicare’s adoption of these approaches,
first exploring statutory issues and then constitutional issues.
II
MANAGED CARE TOOLS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
TRADITIONAL MEDICARE PROGRAM
During the mid-1990s, when nearly one million Medicare beneficiaries per
year were migrating from the traditional FFS program to risk-based HMOs,9
and when HMOs were still demonstrating superiority over the traditional
Medicare program in controlling spending,10 policy analysts initiated discussions
on the application of managed care techniques to the traditional program.
These analysts recognized that premium support approaches, which moved
Medicare away from defined benefits to defined government contributions,
were politically controversial and therefore improbable in the near term.11
Because Medicare beneficiaries are less price-sensitive than active employees
given multiple choices,12 analysts also thought that, under a politically acceptable premium support structure, most beneficiaries would likely choose to
remain in traditional Medicare.13
Yet recently, many Medicare+Choice plans have withdrawn from the program, affecting more than 2.2 million beneficiaries.14 At its peak in 1999, the
Medicare+Choice risk program served about 6.3 million enrollees, over sixteen
percent of Medicare beneficiaries. It now serves about five million enrollees, or
about fourteen percent.15 Given the uncertain future of Medicare’s contracting
8. See, e.g., Lynn Etheredge, Reengineering Medicare: From Bill-Paying Insurer to Accountable
Purchaser, in CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 252 (2d ed. 1998);
Peter D. Fox, Applying Managed Care Techniques in Traditional Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct.
1997, at 44; Peter D. Fox, Lynn Etheredge, & Stanley B. Jones, Addressing the Needs of Chronically Ill
Persons Under Medicare, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1998, at 144.
9. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, MEDICARE 2000: 35 YEARS OF IMPROVING
AMERICANS’ HEALTH 29 (2000).
10. Id. at 31.
11. Robert A. Berenson, Medicare+Choice: Doubling or Disappearing (Nov. 28, 2001), at
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Berenson_Web_Excl_112801.htm; Fox, supra note 8, at 45.
12. See Thomas Buchmueller, The Health Plan Choices of Retirees Under Managed Competition, 35
HEALTH SERVICES RES. 946, 968 (2000).
13. See Etheredge, supra note 8, at 253.
14. See Berenson, supra note 11, at W65, W66 (describing new approaches to paying
Medicare+Choice plans given the current difficulties the program is experiencing).
15. Medicare Managed Care Contract (MMCC) Plans, Monthly Summary Report, available at
http://www.HCFA.gov/stats/mmcc0402.zip (last visited Apr. 01, 2002). The Congressional Budget
Office recently projected a sharp decline in future Medicare+Choice enrollment, down to only eight
percent of beneficiaries in 2012. Hearing on the Administration’s FY 2003 Budget Proposals for
Prescription Drugs Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 107th Cong. at 25 (2002) (statement of Dan L.
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with private plans, it is even more important to examine whether the traditional
program should be encouraged to adopt appropriate managed care techniques.16
In recent years, congressional attention has been given both to fundamental
restructuring to promote price competition and to permitting Medicare to
behave as a purchaser or managed care provider. In 2000, based upon the work
of the Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare, the Senate Finance
Committee developed legislative options to “Modernize and Secure the Medicare Program for the 21st Century” that included both a premium support proposal and new authorities to permit the Health Care Financing Administration
to use specific managed care tools.17
Although many Medicare reform advocates support both managed competition and managed care, the concepts are sufficiently different. It is possible to
hold a view that, on the one hand, opposes premium support approaches
because they lead to segmented insurance pools18 and unnecessarily high
administrative costs, and, on the other hand, supports using managed care tools
in the traditional program in order to achieve improved program efficiency and
quality of care.19
This analysis of how Medicare might adopt managed care techniques occurs
at a time when many managed care organizations themselves are giving up
some approaches that have made them distinctive. Their retreat comes in the
face of consumer complaints about undue restrictions on provider choice and
burdensome administrative requirements, and provider complaints about loss of

Crippen,
Director,
Congressional
Budget
Office),
available
at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/ 030702dctest.pdf (last visited May 1, 2002).
16. Writing in 1995, Lynn Etheredge emphasized how Medicare should evolve from a passive bill
payer to an active purchaser of care by using purchasing techniques, including forms of selective,
competitive contracting, capitation and risk-sharing arrangements, provider performance standards
with payment incentives and penalties, high-cost case management, disease management, centers of
excellence for certain specialized clinical problems, and consumer information and incentives.
Etheredge, supra note 8, at 252-53. The National Academy of Social Insurance undertook a
comprehensive assessment of Medicare that included a study panel on the fee-for-service system.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE CHALLENGES OF
THE 21ST CENTURY (1999). In that report, Peter Fox contributed a paper suggesting that there were a
number of managed care techniques that could be applied in traditional Medicare, developing a
concept similar to Etheredge’s suggestions of Medicare becoming an active purchaser. Peter D. Fox,
The Medicare Fee-For-Service System: Applying Managed Care Techniques, in MEDICARE: PREPARING
FOR THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY, supra, at 185-206.
17. STAFF OF SENATE FIN. COMM., 106TH CONG., MAJOR OPTIONS TO MODERNIZE AND
SECURE THE MEDICARE PROGRAM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (June 14, 2000), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/6-14opt.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
18. Premium support models depend on the use of health status-based risk adjustment of payments
to competing plans to counter the inherent incentive to cherry-picking. Aaron & Reischauer, supra
note 4, at 16-17. Yet, progress in adopting risk adjustment in the Medicare+Choice program has been
slow, both for technical reasons and because of political opposition by the managed care industry. This
situation shows the divergence of the interests of managed care organizations and of market
competition.
19. See Marilyn Moon & Karen Davis, Preserving and Strengthening Medicare, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1995, at 31 (arguing for the need to preserve and strengthen the integrity of the Medicare
program, including improving the basic fee-for-service program).
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clinical autonomy and increased hassles and compliance costs.20 As noted
earlier, legislatures and courts have responded to the backlash by putting limits
on the use of some managed care tools.21
In many ways, MCOs that have responded to consumer preferences by voluntarily withdrawing many of their provider-side interventions now resemble
the very indemnity insurance approaches they were designed to replace. They
maintain broad provider networks, leaving providers alone to practice as they
want, and paying claims and achieving profitability not by constraining costs,
but rather by raising premiums over their actual cost increases in accordance
with the health insurance underwriting cycle.22 Indeed, some plans now actively
advertise that they have abandoned specific components of managed care,
including prior authorization, gatekeepers, and provider financial incentives.23
This retrenchment is taking place at a time when costs and premiums are
rising faster than they have in a decade.24 Some policy analysts have recognized
the standard tools of managed care have achieved broad disrepute. Therefore,
they predict that the next round of cost-cutting will focus on the consumer by
emphasizing more price-sensitive health plan choices and increased patient
cost-sharing.25
The various political and legal constraints applying to Medicare, and the lessons learned from the numerous mistakes MCOs made in executing their
approaches, could cause Medicare to adopt some managed care purchasing
techniques in a kinder and gentler, more effective fashion, despite its trend
toward de-emphasizing its distinctiveness.
Although MCOs are withdrawing some of their cost-cutting tools,26 they
have also developed programs that attempt to improve quality while simultaneously promoting efficiency in an unobtrusive and voluntary manner. For example, some health plans and self-funded employers have added disease management programs that seem to achieve better health outcomes and reduce rates of

20. See James C. Robinson, The End of Managed Care, JAMA, May 23–30, 2001, at 2622
(explaining the backlash to managed care and how consumerism is likely to develop in response).
21. Sloan and Hall, supra note 2, at 194.
22. Gabel et al., supra note 1, at 181.
23. A prominent example of managed care’s retrenchment was United Health Group’s decision to
abandon utilization review, labeled by the Wall Street Journal as a “watershed event in the history of
managed care.” Carol Gentry, UnitedHealth Move on Reviews is Seen as Industry Watershed, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 10, 1999, at B6. See CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, AN EMPTY
TOOLBOX? CHANGES IN HEALTH PLANS’ PRACTICES FOR MANAGING COSTS AND CARE (2001)
(draft working paper for a survey of the changes managed care plans have made in the use of their
various tools) (on file with author) [hereinafter CSHSC Draft].
24. Gabel et al., supra note 1, at 181.
25. For a general discussion of these issues, see Robinson, supra note 20, at 2625 (applied to
Medicare, Robinson’s reasoning would suggest a form of premium support).
26. While retrenchment has gotten the most attention, one should not over-emphasize the point.
These tools are still used widely, though without fanfare. See CSHSC Draft, supra note 23.
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hospitalization for sub-populations of enrollees with specific clinical problems,
especially chronic diseases, such as congestive heart failure and diabetes.27
Most would view these kinds of initiatives, whether in private health plans
or in traditional Medicare, as desirable program enhancements if they can be
demonstrated to be cost-effective.28 Much more controversial are managed care
tools that have been the target of criticism from providers and consumers,
including selective contracting, prior authorization, and gatekeeping.
III
POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRAINTS
The Medicare statute was a political compromise. On the one extreme were
those who believed that Medicare should be a social insurance program covering all health care beneficiaries on a compulsory basis, financed by payroll
taxes, with a public assistance program as a safety net. On the other extreme
were those who supported only a public assistance program.29 The legislative
compromise that was achieved was based on the structure and function of
existing private insurance. The program was designed to be a passive bill payer
that did not try to influence how care was delivered. To assure this passive role,
the first two sections of the legislation prohibit Medicare from interfering with
the practice of medicine and from limiting beneficiaries’ access to all providers
who choose to participate in the program.30
Even with the health system changing in the private sector, Congress has
generally not permitted the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) to use purchasing tools. This reluctance reflects not only political
27. Medicare Program: Solicitation for Proposals for the Medicare Coordinated Care
Demonstration, 65 Fed. Reg. 46466, 46467 (July 28, 2000). See also Thomas Bodenheimer, Disease
Management—Promises and Pitfalls, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1202 (1999). For documentation of
the varying and disturbing levels of quality of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries, see Stephen F.
Jencks et al., Quality of Medical Care Delivered to Medicare Beneficiaries: A Profile at State and
National Levels, 284 JAMA 1670 (2000).
28. Given the facts that a small proportion of Medicare beneficiaries accounts for a major
proportion of expenditures (in 1996, 12.1 percent of all beneficiaries accounted for 75.5 percent of feefor-service program spending, Medicare Program, 65 Fed. Reg. at 46466), and that many of these
beneficiaries are repeated high users with one or more chronic diseases, Medicare certainly has an
interest in implementing disease management and other care-coordination programs. For the most
part, these programs present substantial operational policy challenges but do not raise specific legal
issues. We do discuss some aspects of high-cost case management which do raise some legal issues. See
infra Part V.
29. See Robert J. Myers, Why Medicare Part A and Part B, As Well As Medicaid?, HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV., Fall 2000, at 53, 53-54.
30. Sections 1801 and 1802, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2001). Occasionally, Medicare has used its
limited statutory authority to act less like a passive payer and more like a purchaser. A prominent
example relates to designation of organ transplant centers. In a series of national coverage policy
notices in the Federal Register, HCFA stated that organ transplants in adults were medically
reasonable and necessary when performed on carefully selected patients in facilities that meet certain
criteria. See Medicare Coverage Policy – Decisions. Re-Evaluation of Criteria for Medicare Approval
of Transplant Centers (#CAG-00061N), available at http://www.hcfa.gov/coverage/8b3%2Daa4.htm
(last visited March 10, 2002); see also National Coverage Policy for heart transplants, 52 Fed. Reg.
10,935 (Apr. 6, 1987); National Coverage Policy for liver transplants, 56 Fed. Reg. 15,006 (Apr. 12,
1991); National Coverage Policy for lung transplants, 60 Fed. Reg. 6,537 (Feb. 2, 1995).
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opposition from the providers who might not do well under the regime of an
active purchaser, but also important policy and operational concerns.
Perhaps the most important policy concern relates to the government’s
exercise of market power. Some providers are particularly dependent for revenues on Medicare patients—for example, for opthalmologists, cardiovascular
specialists and urologists, Medicare represents nearly half of total revenues.31
Dialysis centers are almost totally dependent on Medicare revenues as a result
of the creation of an end-stage renal disease benefit. Under these circumstances, with rare exceptions, Medicare has to pay at administered prices and
cannot use its purchasing power to negotiate market rates because Medicare’s
large share of payments would distort the market.32
Medicare differs from traditional federal regulatory programs in that a
transfer of resources to private individuals is not an incidental and undesirable
result of the program, but rather the very reason for the program’s existence.33
Medicare, nevertheless, is subject to section 553 of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).34 The APA and other procedural requirements limit
agency discretion and create a lengthy decision-making process, certainly in
contrast to private health plans.35 Specific procedural requirements aside, there
is a general expectation that a government purchasing program would treat
providers fairly because of general notions of due process and equal protection,
and because its participation is voluntary.36
Due to procedural restrictions that limit discretion and the national nature
of the program, there has been an expectation of uniform treatment, such as
similar treatment of providers and suppliers with similarly objective characteristics.37 There is no expectation that uniform treatment can be applied within or
across areas, however, because active purchasing is local .
It is important to note that the requirement of uniform national policies,
particularly regarding payment formulas, results in vastly disproportionate
aggregate payments across the country. This phenomenon became very notice31. The American Medical Association’s socioeconomic survey showed that ophthalmologists,
cardiovascular specialists, and urologists received forty-nine percent, forty-seven percent, and fortyfour percent of their revenues from Medicare. Interview with Sarah Thran, American Medical
Association, in Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 7, 2001).
32. Medicare: Successful Reform Requires Meeting Key Management Challenges: United States
General Accounting Office (“GAO”), Testimony of William J. Scanlon before the House Committee
on the Budget, 106 Cong. at 3 (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d011006t.pdf
[hereinafter Scanlon Testimony].
33. See Timothy Stoltzfuss Jost, Recent Development: Health Care Symposium: Governing
Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 59 (1999).
34. Id. at 88. HCFA decided in 1971 to comply voluntarily with Section 553. Id. at 88 n.271.
Congress codified this decision with respect to specified Medicare program regulations. Id. at 88 n.272.
35. Scanlon Testimony, supra note 32, at 3 (contrasting Medicare’s ability to change program
requirements with that of private plans).
36. See id. at 53. Infra Part V.C. specifically deals with constitutional due process issues.
37. The one notable exception is coverage policy, where there is explicit recognition that there
might well be local variations. THE LEWIN GROUP, REPORT 2: THE MEDICARE PAYMENT PROCESS
AND PATIENT ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY 30-31 (2000) [hereinafter LEWIN REPORT] (second article in
a series of reports prepared by the Lewin Group for Advamed).
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able because payments in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(“TEFRA”) risk contracting program, and now in the Medicare+Choice program, are based on spending levels in the traditional, FFS program at the
county level, even though spending varies significantly.38 Most of the difference
in county-level spending probably represents practice style,39 which the program
is not able to influence, thus producing widely varying county payment rates
across the country.40
A major barrier to adopting managed care cost-cutting techniques is the
division of the Medicare budget between mandatory dollars to pay for services
and discretionary dollars to pay for administration. Currently, Medicare spends
less than two percent of program outlays on administration,41 compared to over
ten percent for private insurers.42 Adopting virtually any managed care technique would involve increased spending on program administration, yet savings
would accrue to the trust funds.43
Finally, the adoption of purchasing tools would face a series of practical,
operational issues. Since Medicare is a national program, the organizational
orientation of CMS is national, not local. Most of the staff works in Baltimore,
while the rest are located in ten regional offices and have limited administrative
authority. Much of the actual program administration is done through contractors, including fiscal intermediaries for Part A and carriers for Part B.
Although these entities, based in insurance companies, offer the potential for
the kind of local presence that purchasing would require, the services of these
particular organizations have not been procured through a competitive process.
While there is interest in contractor reform to give CMS broader contracting
authority, the agency currently lacks experience in procuring the kind of expertise at the local level that many managed care techniques would require.

38. 1997 PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REV. COMM’N (“PPRC”) ANN. REP. 29-31 (1997).
39. Aaron & Reischauer, supra note 4, at 17. Recently, Wennberg and his colleagues showed that
the large geographic variation was traceable to the use of “supply sensitive” services, namely, physician
visits, specialty consultations, and hospitalizations, especially in the last six months of life. Higher
spending on such services does not result in more effective care or better health outcomes and does not
represent patient preferences. John W. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate over Medicare
Reform (Feb. 13, 2002), at www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Wennberg_Web_Excl_021302.htm.
40. See Minnesota v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123-24 (D. Minn. 2000), aff’d, 273 F.3d
805 (8th Cir. 2001) (geographic differences in payments to counties under the Medicare+Choice
program do not violate equal protection, because Congress’s policy was rationally related to legitimate
objectives of cost-containment and expansion of options).
41. MEDICARE 2000, supra note 9, at 43.
42. See John K. Iglehart, The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1920, 1921 (2001).
43. A statutory exception to the separation of “mandatory trust fund spending from ‘discretionary’
administrative spending” was the Medicare Integrity Program, created under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, which earmarked mandatory funds for fraud and abuse activities
and permitted savings from fraud recoveries to be retained for additional fraud detection activities and
place the funds in a special account—the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account. Social
Security Act, as added by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104191,
§ 1817(k) (1996).
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These and other constraints restrain Medicare from becoming an active purchaser of care and selectively using managed care tools. Nevertheless, the experience among private health plans, both positive and negative, offers specific
opportunities for Medicare. As we will make clear, both the experience of private plans and the constraints faced by Medicare would fashion how these tools
might be best adapted to the Medicare environment.
IV
PURCHASING TECHNIQUES WITH WHICH MEDICARE MIGHT PROCEED
The ability to contract selectively with the licensed and available providers
in a geographic area has been a hallmark of managed care.44 The traditional
prepaid group practices, such as Kaiser-Permanente, were opposed by organized medicine for many years precisely because they were closed-panel, alternative-delivery systems.45 But even in open-panel, network-model HMOs that
came to the forefront in the 1980s, selective contracting was a prominent tool
used by the plans.46 Some argue that the use of selective contracting is the key
policy issue that must be addressed in considering the applicability of managed
care techniques to a social insurance program such as Medicare, and that it is
what really distinguishes managed care from good management by traditional
payers.47
The basic premise of selective contracting is that MCOs can provide higher
quality at lower cost by limiting the number and balancing the types of providers that plan enrollees may visit.48 Theoretically, the health plan will have a
smaller delivery system that can be more easily managed, and the plan can initially select providers who have reputations for quality and, over time, providers
who have evidence to document higher quality and better efficiency than the
average. Crucially important to those plans that negotiate payment rates in the
market, selective contracting provides substantial negotiation leverage.49 Even
if a plan wants to establish a broadly inclusive network of available providers,
the plausible threat of excluding providers permits plans to obtain more favorable payment rates, at least in those geographic areas where there is competition among providers.
Originally, even open-panel HMOs sought to market relatively small, manageable provider networks. Over time, they met with an unfavorable market
reaction to restricted provider choice. Employers started demanding broad,
almost universal, choice of provider to assuage employees who did not want
44. See Joseph White, Which ‘Managed Care’ for Medicare?, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 1997, at 5, 73.
45. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 323-27 (1982).
46. See WALTER A. ZELMAN & ROBERT A. BERENSON, THE MANAGED CARE BLUES & HOW
TO CURE THEM 69-72 (1988).
47. See generally Joseph White, Targets and Systems of Health Care Cost Control, 24 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 653, 655, 676-82 (1999) (presenting the policy conflicts associated with making
“coordinated payment,” where “payment is coordinated broadly on standard terms across the
community of providers,” and selective contracting).
48. See Marsteller et al., supra note 2, at 1134.
49. See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 46, at 69.
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their choice of provider restricted. For their part, excluded providers were successful in some states in having legal restrictions placed on selective contracting,
through any-willing-provider and freedom-of-choice laws.50
Despite the documented success of selective contracting in reducing costs,51
there has been a broad retrenchment in its use. In their surveys of health
system change in twelve communities, the Center for Studying Health System
Change found that most health plans surveyed had steadily increased the
number of physicians and hospitals with which they contracted, and, by 2000,
few plans were actively constraining the size of their networks or excluding providers based on the efficiency of their practice patterns.52 Reasons cited
included growing consumer demand for provider choice, lack of reliable information on which to base selection, and difficulties demonstrating savings from
limited-network products.
In short, the market has forced health plans into the same position as the
authorizing statute has placed Medicare: They offer virtually all providers and
do not selectively contract, except for relatively infrequent, highly specialized
services. As noted, plans can still use the threat of non-contracting to negotiate
lower payment rates than they otherwise might achieve. Medicare cannot use
such leverage but, for most services, sets relatively aggressive administered
prices.53
Some private plans that feel forced to contract with a broad array of providers nevertheless may profile providers for a number of reasons, including providing performance-based reimbursements and determining specialists from
within the broader network to whom the HMO will refer certain kinds of
cases.54 Within an any-willing-provider system, Medicare similarly would have
an interest in using financial incentives and consumer information to try to
influence beneficiary choice of provider.
The Centers of Excellence provided a prototype for this area.55 The program provided bundled Part A and Part B payments for certain expensive procedures, including coronary artery bypass graft (“CABG”) surgery and hip and
knee replacement surgery to designated hospitals, the Centers of Excellence,
which were selected based on documented high outcomes associated with high
50. See Marsteller et al., supra note 2, at 1134. See also Robert L. Ohsfeldt et al., The Spread of
Any Willing Provider Laws, 33 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1537, 1538 (1998).
51. See Jack Zwanginer et al., The Effect of Selective Contracting on Hospital Costs and Revenues,
35 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 849, 851 (2000) (demonstrating that hospitals in more competitive areas
had a substantially lower rate of increase in costs and revenues, attributable to the growth of selective
contracting).
52. CSHSC Draft, supra note 23.
53. See Moon & Davis, supra note 19, at 39.
54. See Peter R. Kongstvedt et al., Using Data and Provider Profiling in Medical Management, in
THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 440-54 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 4th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter THE MANAGED HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK].
55. In response to concerns by those hospitals not receiving Centers of Excellence designations
that they would be viewed by the public as not excellent, CMS recently agreed to change the name of
the follow-up demonstration to Medicare Partnerships for Quality Services. See CMS website at
http://cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/research/mpqsdem.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2002).
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volumes of services performed. In addition to receiving information about the
quality differences, Centers were allowed to waive some or all of patient costsharing and could pay for transportation costs, given immunity from the AntiKickback Law.56 Importantly, beneficiaries retained the choice of seeking care
at any participating hospital according to standard statutory cost-sharing and
other terms.
The first Centers demonstration cut program costs by ten percent for the
10,000 CABG surgeries performed, reduced expected mortality, and received
higher patient satisfaction.57 Nevertheless, provider groups have raised major
concerns about a government program designating some providers as higher
quality care providers than others and paying differentially.58
In summary, despite provider opposition to even government-made, qualityrelated designations, the Medicare program has an opportunity to use patient
information, education, and relatively modest financial incentives to influence
beneficiaries’ choice of provider. Importantly, beneficiaries’ freedom of choice
of providers would be maintained, consistent with section 1802.
A. Prior Authorization
Prior authorization is a core activity of Utilization Management (“UM”),
which the Institute of Medicine defined as:
a set of techniques used by or on behalf of purchasers of health care benefits to
manage health care costs by influencing patient care decision-making through case-by59
case assessments of the appropriateness of care prior to its provision.

Utilization management approaches have been used in all types of insurance
products, including indemnity plans. Using prior authorization programs is
what distinguishes managed from unmanaged indemnity, so that its use in the
traditional Medicare program might be expected.
Most of the studies examining the cost-effectiveness of utilization management programs that focused on inpatient care in the private sector took place in
the mid- to late-1980s. A literature review performed in 1990 concluded that
56. See Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175
(1977) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)). Because most beneficiaries have a form of supplemental
insurance, waiving cost-sharing would have attenuated value as an incentive.
57. Medicare Reform: Modernization Requires Comprehensive Program View, 107th Cong. 16
(2001) (testimony of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Financing and Public Health Issues, General
Accounting Division, before House Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy and Commerce).
58. Id. at 17. See also Kristen Hallem, Doctors Fear Excellence Designation; Medicare Center of
Excellence Program, 30 MODERN HEALTHCARE 30 (Dec. 18, 2000). An interesting commentary on
the subject was offered by Tom Scully, then president of the Federation of American Health Systems
and now Administrator of CMS. “The flaw of the fee-for-service system is that it has to pay every
provider the same amount in every community. . . . That is the fundamental flaw of fee-for-service
programs. Providers, obviously, do not like to hear that.” Thomas Scully, Comment on Joseph R.
Antos Preparing for the Retirement of the Baby Boomers, in MEDICARE: PREPARING FOR THE
CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 257, 257 (Robert D. Reischauer et al. eds., 1998).
59. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CONTROLLING COSTS AND CHANGING PATIENT CARE: THE
ROLE OF UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT 2-3 (Bradford H. Gray & Marilyn J. Field eds., 1989). The
terms “utilization review” and “utilization management” are often used interchangeably. The latter
term connotes a somewhat broader set of activities, of which utilization review is a core activity.
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both utilization review programs which focused on hospital use and prior
authorization programs did reduce inpatient utilization and expenditures.60
Based on early successes, programs were expanded first to outpatient surgical
procedures and then even to routine ambulatory referrals from one physician to
another.61
Although much medical review is required to determine that services provided are medically necessary in the Medicare program, most of the activity
performed by the Part A and Part B contractors, the intermediaries and carriers, and by the Peer Review Organizations (“PROs”) is retrospective.62 When
reviews are done—prior to services being rendered, prior authorization and
concurrent review, or after the fact, retrospective review—is a major difference
between managed care utilization review (“UR”) and Medicare UR. 63
There are good reasons to perform prior authorization rather than rely on
after-the-fact review of cases for appropriateness. Most importantly, prior
authorization removes the need to deny payment after resources have been
committed.64 If the only option is to deny payment for services found not to be
medically necessary, as it is under the Medicare statute, retrospective denial
would expose beneficiaries to extraordinary financial liability. Accordingly,
medical reviewers are more likely to invent a rationale for a retrospective
approval for a procedure or admission that they would have denied under a
prior authorization regime.65 Also, retrospective review exposes patients to possibly harmful interventions that might have been avoided if they had been subjected to prior authorization.66
Of course, prior authorization, especially when broadly applied, is viewed as
highly intrusive by physicians67 and has been abandoned by some insurance
companies.68 It was also abandoned in Medicare after making a brief appear60. See Thomas M. Wickizer, The Effect of Utilization Review on Hospital Use and Expenditures: A
Review of the Literature and an Update on Recent Findings, 47 MED. CARE REV. 327 (1990).
61. See Kongstvedt et al., Managing Basic Medical-Surgical Utilization, supra note 54, at 294-330.
62. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ENHANCE
PATIENT QUALITY OF CARE 27 (1996) [hereinafter GAO FEDERAL EFFORTS]; U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: INADEQUATE REVIEW OF CLAIMS PAYMENTS LIMITS ABILITY
TO CONTROL SPENDING (1994) [hereinafter GAO INADEQUATE REVIEW].
63. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE
IDENTIFICATION OF INAPPROPRIATE CARE 3, 17 (1989) [hereinafter GAO MEDICARE].
64. Id. at 18.
65. Id. at 32.
66. Id. at 18.
67. Id. at 18. See also Eve A. Kerr et al., Associations Between Primary Care Physician Satisfaction
and Self-Reported Aspects of Utilization Management, 35 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 333, 333 (2000).
68. CSHSC Draft, supra note 23. Patients and consumer advocates have also complained about
prior authorization as an intrusion into the doctor-patient relationship and the claim that clerks or bean
counters were overruling physicians’ clinical decisions. GAO FEDERAL EFFORTS, supra note 62, at 27
(describing the categories involved in individual case review by the PROs in the fifth scope of work;
prior authorization of specified hospitalization services was no longer a category). In reporting on
structured interviews with consumer representatives, Singer and Bergthold reported that “consumers
interviewed were unaware that both the National Committee for Quality Assurance (‘NCQA’) and the
Knox-Keene Act, which regulates managed care plans in California, require that only licensed
physicians can make medical necessity decisions or denials, and that NCQA audits compliance with
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ance in the program in the mid- to late 1980s.69 As an example of prior authorization, under the third Scope of Work70 contracts, PROs were required to perform prospective reviews for ten medical and surgical procedures, such as
cataract extractions and carotid endarterectomies.71
By the early 1990s, the Health Care Financing Administration abandoned
PRO prior authorization72 and presaged what would happen in private plans,
namely, a marked backlash by physicians and patients, which has led many private plans to abandon prior authorization in part or completely.73
What went wrong? Certainly, some of the problem was related to blind
adherence to fragments of evidence of appropriateness that led to the drivethrough-deliveries phenomenon, which quite effectively aligned the interest of
the public with those of physicians.74 Health plans lost the moral high ground
they might have claimed for trying to reduce unnecessary and possibly harmful
hospitalizations and procedures. Instead, they became easy targets for caricature and ridicule.
Another major execution problem resulted from the assumption of health
plan and benefit consultants that, if some prior authorization is good, more
must be better. Prior authorization requirements became commonly applied
not only to high-cost, relatively rare hospitalizations, but also to routine,
common ambulatory care encounters,75 dramatically raising administrative costs
and the amount of intrusion into clinical practice. Also, prior authorization
programs typically treated all providers the same, which Medicare arguably has
to do, but private plans did not. The technique was not targeted to problem
providers, based on utilization management profiling, but rather applied with a
broad brush, thereby arousing the ire of potential physician allies in health plan
these requirements.” Sara J. Singer & Linda A. Bergthold, Prospects for Improved Decision Making
About Medical Necessity, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 200, 201.
69. Katherine N. Lohr & A.J. Walker, The Utilization and Quality Control Peer Review
Organization Program, in MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE 413-414 (Katherine
N. Lohr ed., 1990) (conducting a complete review of the origins and activities of the PRO program
from inception until the summer of 1989). A focus on utilization review through the peer review
organizations complemented implementation of the hospital prospective per case payment system
(“PPS”), which went into effect in 1985. The per case payment system has an incentive for
inappropriate hospitalization of low acuity patients.
70. Scope of Work refers to contract cycles that initially were for two years and that in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 were extended to three years. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330. Thus, the third Scope of Work was developed in which one-fourth of the PROs began the
contract cycle on October 1, 1988 and the remaining PROs on April 1, 1989. Lohr & Walker, supra
note 69, at 345.
71. GAO MEDICARE, supra note 63, at n.61.
72. GAO FEDERAL EFFORTS, supra note 62, at 27.
73. The CSHSC survey found that, prior to 1998, nearly all HMO and PPO products in the twelve
surveyed communities required patients to obtain prior authorization from the plan for many inpatient
and outpatient procedures. From 1998 until their interviews in 2000-01, sixteen of forty-eight plans
eliminated selected prior authorization requirements. See CSHSC Draft, supra note 23.
74. Technically, a two-day limit on hospital stay after pregnancy is called concurrent review, not
prior authorization. They are complementary procedures in utilization management. GAO MEDICARE,
supra note 63, at 17.
75. Kongstvedt et al., supra note 61, at 294-330.
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networks who might have supported prior authorization if targeted to address
problematic performance.
Given the backlash to prior authorization performed by the PROs in the
1980s and the current backlash toward its use by private plans, why would
Medicare ever consider reinstituting prior authorization? Because that is where
the money is. Of note, the CSHSC study discussed earlier shows that the
majority of health insurance products have maintained their utilization management requirements in the face of opposition from providers, patients, and
even political candidates.76 It is important to note that capitated, at-risk medical
groups in California adopted the very techniques of utilization management—
including prior authorization—to manage their own risk about which physicians
complained when performed by insurance companies and third-party administrators.77
When performed by Medicare, prior authorization should be narrowly
applied and targeted, unlike the general approach that has been used by many
health insurers. Given the checkered history of prior authorization, Medicare
should only apply prior authorization to procedures that meet most or all of the
following criteria: (1) have high unit cost; (2) are infrequently performed; (3)
are elective, such that the time to conduct external review would not affect outcomes; (4) rely on clinical judgment based largely on objective, easily retrievable information; (5) have associated evidence of or reason to expect significant
variations in use; and (6) would benefit from a review process focused on quality, as well as costs.
Although these criteria might seem to eliminate almost everything from
consideration, the dissemination of expensive, new diagnosis and treatment
technology offers opportunities beyond what can be provided by the new
approaches in determining what new technologies and services are reasonable
and necessary.78 In addition, Medicare should utilize profiling to foster better
provider relations and lower administrative costs. Through the use of profiling,
Medicare should, over time, be able to exempt from prior authorization
76. See CSHSC Draft, supra note 23.
77. Eve A. Kerr et al., Managed Care and Capitation in California: How Do Physicians at Financial
Risk Control Their Own Utilization?, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 500, 500-04 (1995).
78. LEWIN REPORT, supra note 37, at 34. A good candidate for prior authorization would be the
recently approved ocular photodynamic therapy for age-related macular degeneration (“AMD”), the
leading cause of blindness in adults over fifty. National Institutes of Health, Recruitment Begins for
Study on Age-Related Macular Degeneration, available at http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/jul99/nei-07.htm
(Jul. 7, 1999) [hereinafter NIH, Recruitment]. The NIH has estimated that 1.7 million adults over sixtyfive have AMD. Id. Vertoporfin was approved by the Food and Drug Administration in April 2000,
based on studies showing efficacy for delaying deterioration in vision AMD. Id. Later in 2000, it
received a positive National Coverage Decision by Health Care Financing Administration. Medicare
Coverage Policy Decisions—Ocular Photodynamic Therapy with Verteporfin, available at
http://www.hcfa.gov/coverage/8b3-ee.htm (last visited May 1, 2002). If used for the nearly 200,000
Medicare beneficiaries that, under current FDA-approved indications, can benefit from the therapy,
Medicare would spend $2.5 billion dollars for beneficiaries who currently have the diagnosis and
another $250 million per year for the 20,000 new cases of wet macular degeneration that develop each
year. From this estimate, one can see the scale of spending if used for some portion of the large
majority of patients with “dry” AMD.
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requirements those physicians who consistently meet the relevant clinical
appropriateness criteria.
B. Gatekeeper/Case Management Programs
The use of primary care physicians as gatekeepers is another core component that has characterized much of managed care, particularly, but not exclusively, HMOs.79 As with other managed care tools, gatekeeping can serve multiple functions. These include containing costs by restricting referrals to
specialists, increasing access to primary and specialty care, or improving coordination of care by generalists.80
Indeed, the terminology used to describe gatekeeping reflects not only the
primary purpose of the intervention, but also its political viability. For example,
although gatekeeper programs used by state Medicaid agencies were designed
to alter utilization patterns of Medicaid beneficiaries as well as provide them a
medical home,81 the terminology changed by the early 1990s to primary care
case management (“PCCM”), presumably because of the pejorative connotation of gatekeeping.
Gatekeeping is not unique to the United States or to managed care, as it is
widely used in European health systems, both in FFS and capitated arrangements.82 Nevertheless, the mandatory enrollee assignment to a primary care
physician who approves referrals has been a prominent source of resentment
against MCOs. As with prior authorization programs, many plans have withdrawn their gatekeeping programs.83
There is evidence of a decrease in costs and specialty utilization within
health plans that use primary care gatekeeping, particularly among groups of
patients who might otherwise have relatively high rates of specialty utilization.84
Nevertheless, although many of the studies comparing the performance of generalists and specialists have methodological flaws, the literature does suggest
that generalists lag behind specialists in using recommended diagnostic and
treatment modalities.85

79. ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 46, at 76-78.
80. See Timothy G. Ferris et al., Leaving Gatekeeping Behind: Effects of Opening Access to
Specialists for Adults in a Health Maintenance Organization, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1312, 1312 (2001)
(finding in a capitated, multispecialty group practice little evidence of changing use of specialty services
in the first eighteen months after elimination of gatekeeping).
81. See Robert E. Hurley et al., Gatekeeper Effects on Patterns of Physician Use, 32 J. FAM. PRAC.
167, 167 (1991).
82. See Juan Guervas et al., Primary Care, Financing and Gatekeeping in Western Europe, 11 FAM.
PRAC., 307, 307-17 (1994).
83. CSHSC Draft, supra note 23.
84. See Ferris et al., supra note 80, at 1312 for a comprehensive literature review of the effects of
gatekeeping.
85. See Sloan & Hall, supra note 2, at 170 n.3 (concluding that specialists tend to outperform
generalists in their field of expertise. The authors also conclude that no studies demonstrate that this
theoretical flaw of gatekeeping has resulted in worse outcomes or process measures for HMO
enrollees).
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Seniors and disabled beneficiaries appear to be an ideal population for a
primary care physician functioning as a care coordinator because they have
more chronic diseases than the relatively healthy population or those Medicaid
beneficiaries required to be in PCCM programs. The general backlash to gatekeeping, however, and the concern about primary care physicians handling
clinical problems beyond their expertise would seem to preclude consideration
of a mandatory, primary care gatekeeper requirement in Medicare.86
Many health plans, as well as the Medicare PACE program,87 have utilized
non-physician, case-management programs for patients with a single catastrophic illness or multiple debilitating, chronic diseases. Case management has
been defined as “a collaborative process which assesses, plans, implements,
coordinates, monitors, and evaluates the options and services required to meet
an individual’s health needs, using communication and available resources to
promote quality, cost-effective care.”88
CMS is currently conducting a demonstration of case management and
disease management programs that are targeted to the small population of
beneficiaries that are responsible for a major proportion of Medicare expenditures.89 As noted earlier, targeted case-management and disease-management
programs would be useful in a modernized Medicare program if proven to be
cost-effective. There should be little policy or legal concern for targeting those
who can benefit from these programs. Similarly, if beneficiary participation in
these programs were voluntary, there should be little problem with restricting
freedom of choice in Medicare+Choice plans or hospice.
There is another issue relevant to case management, which should be noted.
In addition to coordinating services and educating and monitoring patients, case
managers in MCOs typically have authority to provide individual patients offpolicy benefits, allowing them discretion in instances where treatment goals
may be achieved in a more cost-effective manner.90 The question whether
Medicare could approve non-statutory benefits on a case-by-case basis will be
considered later.

86. As an alternative, the agency could promote the desirability of seniors voluntarily choosing to
have a primary care physician be the source of primary care and to help care coordination among
specialists.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1395eee (2000).
88. Catherine M. Mullahy, Case Management and Managed Care, in THE MANAGED HEALTH
CARE HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at 371.
89. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
90. See Mullahy, supra note 88, at 373.
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V
LEGAL ISSUES
A. The Current Statutory Scheme for Medicare Providers and Patients
Under the current statutory scheme, Medicare beneficiaries have the right
to choose any qualified provider.91 In a corresponding manner, virtually any
licensed healthcare provider has the opportunity to participate in this lucrative
federal program.
In addressing provider participation, the current statute makes a distinction
between health care facilities and individual physicians. For health care facilities, which are referred to as providers, the statute and regulations establish a
system of provider agreements.92 The Secretary of Health and Human Services
is essentially required to enter into an agreement with any entity that requests
participation and meets the applicable conditions of participation.93 Although
providers may terminate their agreements without cause, the grounds on which
the Secretary may refuse to enter into an agreement, terminate an agreement,
or refuse to renew an agreement are extremely limited.94 Individual physicians
enjoy an even more privileged status under the Medicare statute, since they are
not subject to the above-described system of provider agreements and conditions of participation. In effect, the Medicare statute permits anyone who is
licensed or authorized to practice medicine by the laws of a state to treat Medicare beneficiaries and to receive compensation for doing so.95
Notwithstanding the beneficiary’s free choice of provider, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services has authority to exclude an individual physician, as
well as a facility, from participation in the program for statutorily specified reasons.96 Exclusion is mandatory for certain conduct, such as conviction of a program-related crime.97 In addition, the Secretary has the discretion to exclude an
individual or facility for other specified conduct, such as providing patients with
services that are “substantially in excess of the needs of such patients or of a
quality which fails to meet professionally recognized standards of health care.”98
At least theoretically, the Secretary already has the statutory authority to
exclude physicians and institutions on the grounds of inadequate quality and
excessive utilization. Except in the most egregious cases, however, it is difficult
91. See Social Security Act § 1802, 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(a) (2000).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 489.10.
93. See id.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(b); 42 C.F.R. § 489.12.
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (defining “physician”). The statute does include the concept of
“participating physician,” but merely refers to the routine acceptance of assignment, and even nonparticipating physicians have the right to be compensated by the program for treating Medicare
patients. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b). Therefore, in this article, the term “participation” is used in the
broader sense of treating Medicare beneficiaries and receiving payment from the Medicare program.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2000).
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(6)(B). See also 42 C.F.R. § 1001; 42 C.F.R. § 489.54.

BERENSON_FMT.DOC

156

10/23/02 1:50 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 65: No. 4

to exclude physicians and institutions from participation in the program on
those grounds.99
As corollaries to the free choice of provider, the current statutory scheme
requires uniformity in payment to providers and in cost-sharing by beneficiaries. For each type of provider, the statutes set forth a single methodology to
determine the payment for services rendered, such as prospective payment for
hospital services and fee schedules for physicians. Within each category of provider, the amount of payment may vary based on the service performed or the
patient’s diagnosis. The statutes do not, however, include any mechanism to
pay a retrospective bonus or a higher prospective rate for services of greater
quality and efficiency. Similarly, the statutes delineate the responsibility of the
beneficiary for co-payments and deductibles, but do not permit any differentiation in cost-sharing on the basis of the beneficiary’s choice of provider. The
statutes also require uniformity of benefits and administration of benefits for all
eligible beneficiaries. This prevents the use of flexible case management, voluntary negotiation of off-policy benefits, and targeting of particular services, providers, and geographic areas for prior authorization or other types of more
intensive utilization review.
Finally, the statutes include an explicit prohibition in section 1801 against
any federal interference with the practice of medicine or the operation of any
health care facility.100 Despite the broad language of that statute, it has not been
interpreted as a significant limitation on federal authority. First, courts have
recognized that section 1801 must be read in pari materia with other provisions
of the Medicare law, including the provisions on cost containment101 and qualifications of providers.102 Second, courts have reasoned that Congress intended to

99. See William H. Dow & Dean M. Harris, Exclusion of International Medical Graduates from
Federal Health-Care Programs, 40 MED. CARE 68, 69 (2002) (concluding that data on exclusion of
physicians from Medicare indicates that only a small percentage of those exclusions is explicitly based
on quality of care or efficiency).
The any-willing-provider (“AWP”) concept and the beneficiary’s free choice of provider may make
it more difficult for the program to exclude physicians and institutions for cause, such as a failure to
meet appropriate standards of quality and utilization. Although the current statute only gives
beneficiaries the right to select a “qualified” provider and includes clear authority to exclude physicians
and institutions for cause, 42 U.S.C. § 1395a(a) (2000), there is an understandable reluctance to exclude
all but the worst performers from a system in which virtually everyone is allowed to participate.
In addition, the AWP concept prevents the Medicare program from terminating providers for
business reasons, such as eliminating low-volume providers in the interest of administrative efficiency.
100. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395. Specifically, this section provides that
[n]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to
exercise any supervision or control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which
medical services are provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any officer or
employee of any institution, agency, or person providing health services; or to exercise any
supervision or control over the administration or operation of any such institution, agency, or
person. Id.
101. See Home Health Care, Inc. v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 587, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also Mount
Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 344 (5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that a system of
immediate claims review was created by the same Congress that adopted § 1801).
102. See Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006, 1010 (7th Cir. 1974) (dicussing qualifications of
physical therapists).
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encourage physicians to practice in a cost-effective manner, and, therefore,
encouraging physicians to consider financial issues in their treatment decisions
does not constitute federal supervision or control.103 In light of these decisions,
section 1801 does not prevent the Medicare program from imposing restrictions
and limitations on the payment of providers,104 nor does that statute prevent the
Secretary from using payment mechanisms that give financial incentives to providers.105
B. Proposed Statutory and Regulatory Changes106
In addition to the inherent power of Congress to amend its own prior acts,
Congress explicitly reserved the right to amend or repeal any part of the Social
Security Act, which would include the Medicare provisions in Title XVIII of
that Act.107 In order to implement the reforms proposed in this article, it would
be necessary to amend section 1802,108 which guarantees the free choice of any
qualified provider, as well as the corresponding provisions on participation by
physicians and facilities.
This article does not propose to amend section 1802 to replace the existing
any-willing-provider (“AWP”) system with a process of selective contracting.

103. See Home Health Care, 717 F.2d at 590-91; Rasulis, 502 F.2d at 1010; Pleasantview
Convalescent & Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Weinberger, 565 F.2d 99, 103 (7th Cir. 1976).
For example, in a challenge by the American Medical Association to the validity of the Secretary’s
regulations on the Maximum Allowable Cost (“MAC”) of prescription drugs, the district court held
that the regulations would not constitute federal supervision of medical practice, even if the regulations
would affect the prescribing habits of physicians. AMA v. Mathews, 429 F. Supp. 1179, 1201-03 (N.D.
Ill. 1977). The court reasoned that the effect on medical practice would be merely “incidental,” and
that having an impact on unnecessary medical care was intended by Congress “as a permissible byproduct of cost controls.” Id. at 1202-03. At least theoretically, the court recognized that Section 1801
could prevent some mechanisms of cost control that go too far in limiting professional judgment, but
those mechanisms would be permissible so long as there was “an informed medical decision that the
incurred costs are necessary in the efficient delivery of health services.” Id. at 1202. But see AMA v.
Weinberger, 522 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 1975) (upholding preliminary injunction against enforcement of
Medicare regulation on immediate utilization review, in part because a direct influence on doctors’
decisions would violate Section 1801).
104. See Heckler, 717 F.2d at 591; Mathews, 429 F. Supp. at 1201-02. See also Mount Sinai, 517 F.2d
at 344 (recouping funds paid by the program for unnecessary care would not violate Section 1801,
despite the claimed chilling effect on professional judgment). Accord Szekely v. Florida Med. Ass’n,
517 F.2d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 1975). Moreover, courts have specifically rejected the contention that
refusing to pay for a particular method of delivering services is tantamount to prohibiting that method
of delivery. See Home Health Care, 717 F.2d at 591.
105. In addition, some aspects of medical practice and facility operation would be beyond the scope
of Section 1801 on the ground that they constitute business decisions rather than professional judgment.
See Pleasantview, 565 F.2d at 103.
In a totally different approach to Section 1801, the California Court of Appeals held that this
federal statute was intended to preserve state and local control over health care licensure and to avoid
federal preemption in that area. Bell v. City of Mountain View, 66 Cal. App. 3d 332, 340 (1977).
106. For the reasons discussed above, it would not be necessary to amend or repeal Section 1801,
because that statute has not been interpreted to impose any significant limitation on the authority of
the government.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1304. As part of the Social Security Act, Title XVIII on Medicare is subject to the
general provisions in Title XI, including § 1304.
108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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For the reasons discussed above,109 it would not be advisable for Medicare to
contract exclusively with some providers to the total exclusion of others, except
perhaps for a few non-professional commodities such as durable medical
equipment. Instead, section 1802 and the corresponding sections on provider
participation should be amended to authorize financial incentives for beneficiaries to select the highest quality and most efficient providers, while continuing
to permit beneficiaries’ choice of any qualified provider. Under this alternative,
the revised section 1802 would still guarantee the beneficiary’s freedom of
choice. The revised section, however, would explicitly acknowledge that the
beneficiary may incur lower co-payments for selecting a preferred provider, and
would explicitly acknowledge that the provider selected by the beneficiary
would not necessarily be paid the same as all other qualified providers.110
To implement the proposed system of contracting at differential rates with
preferred and non-preferred providers, it would also be necessary to amend the
current statutory provisions that effectively require all providers to be paid on
equal terms. At least theoretically, statutory provisions requiring specific payment methodologies for each category of provider could be replaced with a
broad grant of authority to the Secretary to procure services for Medicare beneficiaries on such terms, and with such variations in terms, as are deemed to be in
the best interest of the program and its beneficiaries.111 A less radical and more
politically realistic approach would be to retain the existing payment methodologies in the statutes, while adding statutory authorization for the Secretary
and his agents to enter into contracts on different terms of payment, on either a
national or local basis, with physicians and facilities who are willing to enter
into contracts on an alternative basis. To impose limits on local intermediaries
and carriers, the Secretary could issue general guidelines for alternative contracting, with local agents negotiating alternative arrangements within those
parameters. If those alternative contracts were voluntary, they would be less
problematic from a legal and political perspective.
In amending the statute, Congress should not permit the Medicare program
to terminate providers without cause, as is permitted by contract in some private managed care plans.112 That approach would be inadvisable for a program
109. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
110. Conforming changes would also be required to the statutes on co-payments and deductibles.
111. Jost, supra note 33, at 66 (“Congress has not been content to establish the broad framework of
the Medicare program, but has in many respects micromanaged programmatic detail as well.”); see also
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE: TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CHALLENGES PROMPT
FRESH THINKING ABOUT PROGRAM’S ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 14 (2000) (“micromanagement
of Medicare”).
112. Theoretically, the Medicare statute could be amended to specify that (i) all provider
agreements will expire by their own terms after a limited period of time; (ii) the Secretary may
terminate any provider agreement without cause upon adequate notice; and (iii) the Secretary may
refuse to renew an agreement without cause. In addition, the statute could be amended to explicitly
state that the Secretary has no obligation to enter into an agreement with any individual or entity, and
that the Secretary has the discretion to enter into contracts on a selective, exclusive, or differential basis
for the benefit of the program and its beneficiaries. Finally, the statute could also be amended to bring
physicians into a system of written contracts that have limited duration and are terminable without
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such as Medicare that relies on the public for both financial and political support. In addition, termination without cause can be used as a subterfuge to
avoid the need for legal proceedings and legal justification in situations that are
really terminations for cause.113 Therefore, the Medicare statute should continue to require cause to terminate or refuse to renew providers, but the exclusion of providers on grounds of quality and efficiency might be enhanced
through the use of objective standards and clinical practice guidelines.114
Moreover, the statute should be amended to provide greater flexibility in
benefits and in the administration of benefits. Specifically, Congress should
grant the Secretary statutory authority to use prior authorization in those situations in which the Secretary considers it to be useful and appropriate. This
change would allow the Secretary and his agents to tailor the use of prior
authorization to particular services, providers, and geographic areas. The statute should also be amended to permit the Medicare program to use modern
methods of case management, and to provide off-policy benefits by voluntary
negotiation with the beneficiary, provided that the cost to the program for the
off-policy benefit is not anticipated to exceed the amount that would have been
paid for the standard benefit.115
In addition to amending the laws on provider participation, payment, and
benefits, it would be necessary to amend the laws on Medicare fraud and abuse

cause. However, as stated above, we think that these types of changes would be inappropriate for the
Medicare program.
113. In the analogous context of de-participation without cause by private managed care plans, a
few courts have allowed the aggrieved physician to argue that the purpose of termination violated
public policy. See, e.g., Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 4th 1060, 1073 (2000) (“We therefore
agree with Potvin that the ‘without cause’ termination clause is unenforceable to the extent it purports
to limit an otherwise existing right to fair procedure under the common law.”); Harper v. Healthsource
N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962, 964 (N.H. 1996) (holding that a managed care organization’s contractual right
to terminate a physician without cause could not be exercised for a reason that is contrary to the public
policy of the State).
114. In addition to recommending that the ability of the program to terminate providers for lack of
quality or efficiency be enhanced, some commentators have recommended that Congress impose more
stringent conditions of participation or authorize the Secretary to impose higher conditions of
participation by means of regulation. For example, Lee Newcomer has suggested that Medicare’s
conditions of participation should require hospitals to use a computerized order entry system. Lee N.
Newcomer, Medicare Pharmacy Coverage: Ensuring Safety Before Funding, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 2000,
at 59; see also Etheredge, supra note 8. However, that approach could be difficult to implement. Under
42 U.S.C. § 1395bb, the vast majority of hospitals are “deemed” to comply with Medicare certification
requirements on the basis of their accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (“JCAHO”). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, The External Review of Hospital Quality: The Role of Medicare
Certification 1, 6 (1999) (only twenty percent of participating hospitals are non-accredited and undergo
the governmental survey and certification process). Moreover, there are currently no conditions of
participation in existence for physicians, and, therefore, it would be difficult at this point to establish a
complete set of meaningful requirements.
115. In addition, Clark Havighurst has raised the possibility of permitting the Medicare program to
pay the amount of the standard benefit for patients who select a non-traditional, experimental, or
unapproved treatment, rather than denying all payment for the chosen procedure. That idea deserves
serious consideration, and would require the same type of statutory change discussed above. Interview
with Clark Havighurst, Professor of Law, Duke University Law School, in Durham, N.C. (Aug. 29,
2001).
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in order to permit new types of financial arrangements and incentives that
encourage selection of cost-effective providers. For example, in order to
encourage beneficiaries to seek care from a cost-effective provider or a Center
of Excellence that is distant from the beneficiary’s home, it may be necessary
for the provider to pay the transportation expenses of the beneficiary and his
family. On its face, that type of payment would constitute remuneration for the
purpose of encouraging the beneficiary to obtain treatment at a particular facility, and would violate the Anti-Kickback Law.116 In order to provide the flexibility for this type of beneficial incentive, the Anti-Kickback Law could be
amended, or the Secretary could use his existing statutory authority to establish
safe harbors by means of formally adopted rules.117
The proposed reforms would also require changes to other statutes that are
not part of the Medicare law. Statutes and regulations that protect the privacy
of patient information should be carefully reviewed and amended as necessary
because they may prevent the use or disclosure of information that is needed
for effective case management.118 In addition, since beneficiaries will be encouraged to select providers on the basis of quality and efficiency, they will need the
information that will enable them to make informed choices about their providers. Therefore, laws that currently prevent the public release of data on the
quality of health care services should be amended to permit broader disclosure
to the public.119
Under the proposed reforms, the Medicare program will publicly characterize some providers as non-preferred or less-preferred, because of their alleged
lack of quality or efficiency. In communicating with their current and potential
patients, providers should be allowed to rebut those negative statements by the
Medicare program, albeit at the provider’s own expense. For example, if the
Medicare program identifies a physician as a non-preferred provider because of
the physician’s high mortality rate, the physician ought to have the right to
place an advertisement in the local newspaper to the effect that his high mortality rate is the result of treating patients who are more acutely ill than the
average. Similarly, if a physician is designated as non-preferred because of
alleged inefficiency, that physician should have the right to publicly respond
that she provides services of higher quality, in order to encourage patients to
116. See supra note 56.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(E).
118. See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82462 (Dec. 28, 2000). That final rule, which was issued pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 110 Stat. 1936, is applicable to
uses and disclosures of patient information by the Medicare program. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 82799
(including the Medicare program within the definition of “health plan” and therefore within the
definition of “covered entity” for purposes of that rule). See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, MEDICARE: SUCCESSFUL REFORM REQUIRES MEETING KEY MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
14 (2001) (stating that privacy of data may hinder targeted disease management).
119. See, e.g., Health Care Quality Imporovement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b) (discussing
confidentiality of information in the National Practitioner Data Bank); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395bb(c) (discussing confidentiality of JCAHO survey results provided to the Secretary for the
purpose of participation in the Medicare program).
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pay the higher co-payments for her supposedly non-preferred services. At the
present time, public statements by health care professionals about the quality of
their services may be prohibited by state licensing laws and the ethical rules of
professional associations, on the theory that advertisement of professional
quality is inherently misleading.120 Therefore, it may be necessary to modify
these restrictions to some extent, or at least to influence their enforcement, in
order to permit the type of communication described above.
Inevitably, there are other statutes that would require amendment to
implement the proposed reforms, and the above is only an attempt to identify
the most important of the necessary amendments. If the political barriers could
be overcome, Congress could make all of the necessary changes or require
those changes to be made by the Secretary. Therefore, the remaining issue is
the extent to which the United States Constitution may limit or influence any
statutory reform of the Medicare program.
C. Constitutional Issues in Implementing the Proposed Reforms
As currently structured, the open system of Medicare participation raises
few constitutional issues. Every qualified provider has the opportunity to participate with payment on uniform terms, and every beneficiary has the opportunity to choose any qualified provider with uniformity of cost-sharing.121 The
government has no constitutional obligation to include unqualified providers as
120. See, e.g., California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 760, 760 n.1 (1999); CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE §§ 651,1680 (West 1990) (restricting advertisements of “professional superiority”).
With regard to antitrust law, in general, it would not be necessary to amend the law, nor would it be
necessary to create any new statutory immunity, in order to implement the reforms that we propose.
Participating in value purchasing would not require anyone to violate the antitrust laws, and the
proposed statutory changes would not result in an implied repeal of the antitrust laws. See Nat’l
Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378, 393 n.18 (1981). See generally William M. Sage & Peter
J. Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need to Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care
Markets, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1069, 1087 (1999). In fact, the reformed market for Medicare
services would be more competitive than the existing market, because providers would compete among
themselves for preferred status, and beneficiaries would be able to choose their optimal levels of cost
and quality.
Some commentators have expressed concern about the tremendous purchasing power of the
Medicare program. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 46. However, that purchasing power does not create
an antitrust problem, for several reasons. First, a federal agency such as CMS is not subject to federal
antitrust law, even as a value purchaser, and neither are its employees who act in their official
capacities. See Rex Sys., Inc. v. Holiday, 814 F.2d 994, 997 (4th Cir. 1987) (collecting cases). Second, in
purchasing services at the lowest possible price, a third-party payor with market power does not violate
antitrust law by acting unilaterally in an economically rational manner. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1984). Finally, existing antitrust laws would be available to remedy any attempt to
interfere with the operation of the more competitive market, to address any spillover effects from the
lawful activities of intermediaries and carriers, and to prevent any unlawful collaboration by purchasers
or providers. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint Purchasing of Health Care, 1995
UTAH L. REV. 409, 432 n.66 (1995) (stating that “[a]n antitrust issue might arise, however, if joint
purchasers act in concert with other large buyers such as Blue Cross and Medicare—for example, by
following Medicare’s lead in setting fee schedules for physicians or DRG allowances for hospitals.”).
121. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text. Although beneficiaries enrolling in a managed
care plan under Part C of Medicare may be subject to restrictions on choice of provider, enrollment in
Part C is voluntary, and all beneficiaries have the opportunity to remain in the traditional fee-forservice Medicare program with free choice of provider.
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vendors in a federal payment program, so long as the government complies with
the requirements of procedural due process in excluding or terminating those
providers. Moreover, it is clear that beneficiaries have no constitutional right to
financial support from the government for services rendered by unqualified
practitioners and facilities.122
The constitutional issues would become more complex and more interesting
if the Medicare program were changed along the proposed lines. Under these
revisions, some qualified providers would be compensated on less favorable
terms than their competitors, and their patients would be given financial incentives to switch to a different provider. These reforms could cause significant
financial losses for particular providers, especially if other third-party payors
follow Medicare’s lead and treat those same providers in a less favorable
manner.123 In addition, co-payments and deductibles would be different for
some beneficiaries. Although these changes could raise theoretical issues of
due process and equal protection, the constitutional limitations on the power of
government would not prevent the type of reform that we propose.
These limitations include substantive due process, takings without just compensation, equal protection, and procedural due process. Although each doctrine is addressed separately, the unifying theme in analyzing these issues is the
nature of the Medicare program as an endeavor that is voluntary for the providers and for the government. Providers who elect to participate in the Medicare program will feel aggrieved but will have little legal right to complain
about their rate of payment or the program’s use of prior authorization, because
participation is purely voluntary for the provider.124 For their part, Medicare
beneficiaries will have limited rights to object to restrictions imposed by the
government, such as prior authorization or case management, because the
beneficiaries are participating in a social welfare program that is not constitutionally mandated.
Thus, the proposed changes would not deprive beneficiaries or providers of
any of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.125 The scope of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
right to make personal choices in matters of marriage, reproduction, education
of children, and similar issues of family life.126 The Constitution, however, does
not provide a right for beneficiaries to receive financial support in using the
122. In describing the rights of a beneficiary under the analogous Medicaid program, the Supreme
Court explained that, “while a patient has a right to continued benefits to pay for care in the qualified
institution of his choice, he has no enforceable expectation of continued benefits to pay for care in an
institution that has been determined to be unqualified.” O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447
U.S. 773, 786 (1980).
123. See Fox, supra note 8, at 46.
124. See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Mathews, 395 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill.),
aff’d, 423 U.S. 975 (1975) (“Underlying the constitutionality of the challenged legislation is the basic
premise that each individual physician and practitioner has the ability to choose whether or not to
participate in the program.”).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
126. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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provider of their choice, even if the provider is fully qualified to render those
services. As seen in the abortion funding cases, the right to choose particular
health care services, even where that right is protected by the Constitution, does
not include the right to receive government funds to pay for the services that
are chosen.127 Thus, although Medicare beneficiaries may have the right to
obtain health care services from any providers who are willing to treat them,
they do not have a constitutional right to require the Medicare program to pay
for the services rendered by those providers. Moreover, because the government is not constitutionally required to provide or support a system of health
insurance for persons who are elderly or disabled,128 the government does not
deprive beneficiaries of liberty by imposing restrictions on the services for
which it voluntarily chooses to pay.129
In a reformed Medicare program, restrictions imposed on some beneficiaries but not others would not constitute a denial of equal protection.130 Distinguishing between beneficiaries on the basis of their choice of provider would
not interfere with fundamental rights or discriminate on the basis of suspect
classifications, and could be easily justified as rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objectives of reducing cost and promoting quality in the Medicare program.131 For the same reasons, it would not violate the requirements of
equal protection to treat some practitioners and facilities differently from others
on the basis of their efficiency and quality, because that would not implicate

127. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980) (“Although the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice
in the context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom.”). Moreover, the Court upheld the
government’s use of financial incentives to influence the beneficiary’s decision. See id. at 325; see also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 782 (2d ed. 1988) (“The Supreme Court
held . . . that the government is even free to influence an indigent pregnant woman’s constitutionally
protected reproductive choice.”).
128. In discussing the analogous due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court stated that, “[a]s a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive
services for those within its border.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
129. See, e.g., Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-17 (“Congress has opted to subsidize medically necessary
services generally, but not certain medically necessary abortions.”); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469
(1977) (“The Constitution imposes no obligation on the [government] to pay the pregnancy-related
medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents.”).
130. Even without an explicit Equal Protection Clause in the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court
has applied a similar analysis to the federal government under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
131. See, e.g., Legion v. Richardson, 354 F. Supp. 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 414 U.S. 1058
(1973) (rejecting equal protection claim by class of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries, where
classifications were not based on suspect grounds, because there was a rational basis for the statutory
classifications); Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123-24 (D. Minn.
2000), aff’d sub nom. Minn. Senior Fed’n v. United States, 273 F. 3d 805 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
geographic differences in the Medicare+Choice program do not violate equal protection, because the
decision of Congress was rationally related to its legitimate objectives of cost-containment and
expansion of options); see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-24 (rejecting equal protection claim where the
challenged statute did not violate a substantive right, was not based on a suspect classification, was
facially neutral, there was no evidence of intentional discrimination, and was rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest).
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suspect classifications or interfere with fundamental rights, and would be justified as rationally related to legitimate governmental goals.
Even if providers are qualified to furnish covered services, the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause does not include a right to participate as
vendors in a federal payment program,132 nor a right to be compensated with
federal funds.133 Because providers have no constitutional right to participate in
the Medicare program at all, they could not complain that they have been
deprived of liberty if they are only allowed to participate subject to conditions
that they view as burdensome.
Several courts have relied on the voluntary nature of Medicare participation
to reject claims by providers that unfavorable terms of payment constitute a
taking without just compensation.134 Although courts in these cases have ordinarily focused on the voluntary nature of participation, it is also questionable
whether health care providers have any property that could be taken by governmental action to limit Medicare reimbursement. Despite the expanded view
of property in the context of procedural due process,135 the Constitution does
not prevent Congress from changing the law in ways that frustrate long-standing
expectations based on the prior law.136 For example, Congress may change or
eliminate benefits under the Social Security program at any time, despite the
contributions and expectations of the recipients.137 Since Congress may change
132. We are not recommending that qualified providers be totally excluded from participation. The
legal implications of exclusion, however, provide a useful framework for understanding the implications
of differential treatment with regard to rates of payment and beneficiary cost-sharing.
133. See Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Mathews, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff’d,
423 U.S. 975 (1975) (rejecting claim that federal legislation for Professional Standards Review violates
the physicians’ right to practice); Rasulis v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 1006, 1010 (7th Cir. 1974) (upholding
Medicare regulation that established conditions for physical therapists, because “[i]t merely provides
standards for the dispensation of federal funds.”).
134. See Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 917 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 821 (1993) (“All
court decisions of which we are aware that have considered takings challenges by physicians to
Medicare price regulations have rejected them in the recognition that participation in Medicare is
voluntary.”); St. Francis Hosp. Ctr. v. Heckler, 714 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1022 (1984) (rejecting claim under Fifth Amendment just compensation provision, despite the practical
necessity of Medicare participation); Pharmacist Political Action Comm. v. Harris, 502 F. Supp. 1235,
1243 (D. Md. 1980) (“There is no compulsion to participate in the program.”). The federal
government’s use of financial incentives for providers without direct regulatory compulsion is
analogous to its use of incentives for state governments under the spending power of Congress. See
generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
135. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
136. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129 (1985) (“Before the statutory change became effective,
the existing property entitlement did not qualify the legislature’s power to substitute a different, less
valuable entitlement at a later date.”).
137. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (“There is no claim here that Congress
has taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, since railroad benefits, like social security
benefits, are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any time.”). But see LAWRENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 627-28 (2d ed. 1988) (criticizing the Court’s analysis in
Fritz). See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 608-611 (1960) (describing the interest of a Social
Security beneficiary as a “noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program”). Recently, the
Supreme Court concluded that providers participating in the Medicare program also receive benefits,
and not merely compensation for services rendered. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 680 (2000).
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or eliminate the interest of a Social Security or Medicare beneficiary without
violating the Constitution, Congress could also change the Medicare program in
ways that subjected providers to less desirable and more burdensome terms.138
In some cases, providers may be able to assert valid claims on the basis of
procedural due process. Even if those claims were successful, they would not
create a barrier to reform. First, it is questionable whether providers have a
constitutionally protected property right or liberty interest in continued Medicare participation.139 Although some courts have recognized a property interest
in continued participation,140 others have flatly rejected it.141 Some courts that
have denied the existence of a property interest have held that providers nevertheless did have a liberty interest in continued participation because the provider’s change of status was accompanied by an allegation that would damage
the provider’s reputation.142
Even if providers have a constitutionally protected interest, that would not
necessarily create an entitlement to continued program participation. Rather, it
would merely entitle providers to an appropriate type of procedure in connection with their change in status.143 Moreover, that procedure may be limited by
the circumstances, and might not have to be conducted before the provider’s
change in status.144 Finally, at any hearing to which the provider is entitled, the
issue to be decided would not be a constitutional question. Rather, the issue at
such a hearing would be whether the Medicare program had violated the provider’s rights, as defined by the Medicare statute and any applicable contract.145
138. See also O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 798 (1980) (Blackmun, J.
concurring) (recognizing that government has the power to completely eliminate the public programs
under which individuals are claiming to have rights).
139. See Midwest Family Clinic, Inc. v. Shalala, 998 F. Supp. 763, 770 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“Courts are
in disagreement as to whether such a property interest exists.”). See generally Eleanor D. Kinney,
Protecting Consumers and Providers Under Health Reform: An Overview of the Major Administrative
Law Issues, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 83, 89-90 (1995).
140. See, e.g., Patchogue Nursing Ctr. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 1137, 1144-45 (2d Cir. 1986); Ram v.
Heckler, 792 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1986). See also Cathedral Rock, Inc. v. Shalala, 223 F. 3d 354, 364
(6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing, implicitly, a protected property interest by considering the type of process
that was due).
141. See, e.g., Erickson v. U.S., 67 F.3d 858, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1995); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d
262, 265 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981).
142. See, e.g., Erickson, 67 F. 3d at 862-63; see generally Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-09 (1976).
143. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972) (“Proof of such a property interest would
not, of course, entitle him to reinstatement”).
144. See Cathedral Rock, 223 F.3d at 364-65 (citing decisions that providers were not entitled to pretermination hearings). See also Erickson, 67 F.3d at 863; Patchogue, 797 F.2d at 1145-46.
145. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 602 (“If it is the law of Texas that a teacher in the respondent’s position
has no contractual or other claim to job tenure, the respondent’s claim would be defeated.”).
As discussed above, we are not proposing that the Medicare statute be amended to permit
termination of providers without cause. However, if a revised Medicare statute and any applicable
contract permitted the Secretary to terminate or refuse to renew a provider’s agreement without cause,
then the provider would not have a constitutionally protected interest, and would not be entitled to a
hearing as a matter of procedural due process. Under those circumstances, even if the provider claimed
that the Secretary’s action was taken for the purpose of infringing the provider’s First Amendment
right to freedom of speech, the provider would have to pursue that claim by filing an action in federal
court, rather than in a due process hearing. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
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Under these circumstances, the nature of any required due process hearing
would depend on the type of governmental action challenged by the provider.
For example, if all low-volume providers were terminated in the interest of
administrative efficiency, a terminated provider would be entitled to some type
of hearing, but that hearing would be limited to an examination of the provider’s historical volume.146 Obviously, the hearing would be more complex if
the provider were terminated for cause on the basis of inadequate quality or
excessive utilization. However, that would be fairly unusual, and would be no
different than the existing, detailed process for exclusion of providers on those
grounds.147 Reducing a physician’s payment status from preferred to non-preferred would also require a hearing on complex issues of fact, but it is reasonable to require that procedure in light of the important interests at stake. Ultimately, even if providers were to succeed on specific claims of procedural due
process, that would not create a significant problem for the Medicare program,
nor would it interfere with the progress of reform.148

146. Although we are not proposing a widespread system of competitive bidding, it might be
appropriate in the case of standardized commodities such as durable medical equipment. Under those
circumstances, if an aggrieved provider had lost in a process of competitive bidding, then the provider
would have a right to protest the government’s award of that contract to a competitor, in a manner
similar to that for defense procurement or public works projects.
147. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2007 (providing for appeal of exclusions by OIG); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.2003
(allowing written requests for a hearing to challenge an exclusion by OIG); 42 C.F.R. § 1005 (specifying
procedures for appeals of exclusions).
With regard to the specific purchasing activities proposed in this article, the conduct of Medicare
intermediaries and carriers, as agents of the federal government, should be treated as federal action and
should be subject to the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, it is not necessary to
analyze whether these particular functions constitute governmental action under the principles set forth
in American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999). However, other types of activities by
Medicare intermediaries and carriers may require a detailed analysis to determine whether they
constitute governmental action. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and
remanded, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999) (remanding for further consideration in light of Sullivan, Sections 4001
and 4002 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, and the HHS regulations that implement those statutory
provisions). See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 622 n.321 (2000).
Even if the conduct of Medicare intermediaries and carriers is deemed to be federal action for
constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court has recently held that private organizations engaged in
federal action are not subject to an implied private right of action for monetary damages for alleged
violations of constitutional rights. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (refusing to
extend Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1977) to a claim against a private
contractor for the federal Bureau of Prisons). That recent decision would alleviate concern about one
type of potential liability for purchasing decisions in a reformed Medicare program.
148. The burden on the Medicare program is also limited somewhat by the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies and the channeling of judicial review. See, e.g., Shalala v. Ill. Council on LongTerm Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000); Jost, supra note 33, at 66 (“Congress has withheld from the courts
jurisdiction over large areas of coverage and payment policy.”); David A. Hyman, Accountable
Managed Care: Should We Be Careful What We Wish For?, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 785, 798 (1999)
(“Congress has quite deliberately insulated broad aspects of the Medicare program from judicial
review.”).
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VI
CONCLUSION
This article has considered whether the most controversial tools of managed
care, including selective contracting, gatekeeping, and prior authorization,
should be adopted in the Medicare program. On policy and practical political
grounds, it does not recommend selective contracting or gatekeeping. Prior
authorization should be targeted much more narrowly than is common practice
by MCOs. Nevertheless, Medicare should be granted the authority to have preferred providers and case management programs that could treat providers differently and could permit certain beneficiaries to receive additional, off-policy
benefits. These managed care tools would need to be expressly provided for in
statutes and do not raise major constitutional issues.

